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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, most preparation for 
admission to the bar in the United States had taken place outside of 
the university, as it had in England.1 Prospective lawyers would 
work under practicing lawyers to learn the art of lawyering.2 
Preparation for legal practice involved reading in the law office and 
observing lawyers in action.3 If a student of the law were unable to 
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David J. Vergobbi of the University of Utah, Lisa Flores of the University of Colorado 
at Boulder, Wayne McCormack of the University of Utah, Tarla Rai Peterson of Texas 
A&M University, and Richard D. Rieke of the University of Utah. The author 
presented an earlier version of this Article as part of a Communication and Law 
Division panel at the 98th annual meeting of the National Communication Association 
in Orlando, Florida, on November 16, 2012. That version of the Article received top 
paper recognition in the Communication and Law Division. 
 1. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S 24 (1983); Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 331, 342 (1951). 
 2. Currie, supra note 1, at 357. 
 3. Richard Davis Rieke, Rhetorical Theory in American Legal Practice 58 (1964) 
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study under the supervision of a practicing attorney, the student 
might read law independently.4 Acquisition of the art of rhetoric,5 if 
any, came from prior education, observation of lawyers in practice, or 
reading earlier works of oratory.6 This approach was very much a 
hands-on approach to learning what was then the trade of lawyering. 
Between 1870 and 1920, a growing group of elite lawyers 
developed U.S. law into an academic field well established within the 
university,7 which law remains to the present day.8 During the same 
time in U.S. history, scholars were developing the social sciences into 
academic fields,9 and the university was taking root.10 As research 
became more important, U.S. higher education became more 
specialized.11  
At Harvard Law School in 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell 
assumed the deanship and, with the support of Charles W. Eliot, 
Harvard’s president, introduced the case method of instruction to his 
students, moving them away from conventional legal textbooks.12 
Instead of lecturing to students, teachers who employed the case 
method would ask students questions about appellate cases.13 
Langdell adopted the belief of Sir William Blackstone, the famous 
eighteenth century commentator on the laws of England, that law 
 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with University 
Library Book Depository, Ohio State University). 
 4. Id. 
 5. The term rhetoric refers to communication, which itself refers to human symbol 
use. SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION: PRESENTATIONAL 
SPEAKING FOR A CHANGING WORLD 4 (2d ed. 2003). This Article focuses on rhetoric 
that is persuasive in nature. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC 
DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).   
 6. Rieke, supra note 3, at 58. 
 7. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal 
Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
311, 314-15 (1985). 
 8. See Anthony Chase, The Legal Scholar As Producer, 13 NOVA L. REV. 57, 67 
(1988) (noting that, because of the law school’s position within the university, the law 
professor must engage in scholarship). 
 9. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 319. 
 10. LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 1-3 
(1965). In the United States, the university, a creation of Western Europe, “could 
uniquely satisfy the social idealism, the personal ambition, and the prideful American 
urge to equal the best of European achievements.” Id. at 3. The university grew out of 
the college. Id. 
 11. Id. at 142-43. 
 12. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314; Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law 
School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 341-42 (1979). At the same time he was supporting 
the introduction of the case method to Harvard Law School, Eliot was supporting 
reform in the undergraduate science curriculum and the medical school curriculum. 
The common objective was moving students away from lecture-based education. 
Chase, supra, at 342-43. 
 13. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52. 
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was a science,14 an idea that had come from the civil law tradition 
and had dated back at least to the Middle Ages.15 Langdell insisted 
that law students attempt to induce scientific principles of law 
through careful examination of appellate cases.16 Such a process was 
supposed to bring order out of chaos.17 Under this Langdellian 
paradigm, law was a system of “unitary, self-contained, value-free, 
and consistent . . . principles” for students to learn.18 
While the university law school began to gain control of much of 
the access to the legal field, the practicing bar began to lose much of 
its control of such access. Eventually, states began to disallow law 
office study as a means of admission to the bar, which opened the 
door to requiring law school study for admission.19 By mid-twentieth 
century, every jurisdiction would allow law school as a means of 
entry into the legal field.20 Only four jurisdictions would mandate 
apprenticeship, and fifteen jurisdictions would not allow 
apprenticeship as a means of entry into the field.21 
At the center of the new academic legal field, recently grounded 
within the university, was the law professor. Within the legal 
profession, the law professor had, and continues to have, “a profound 
impact on thinking about law, procedure, and institutions.”22 Today, 
because “[t]he American law professor is American legal education,”23 
 
 14. Currie, supra note 1, at 350; Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314; STEVENS, supra 
note 1, at 52. Langdell offered several observations about how law was a science. For 
instance, in a speech at Harvard, he made the following statement:   
My associates and myself, therefore, have constantly acted upon the view 
that law is a science, and that a well-equipped university is the true place for 
teaching and learning that science. Accordingly the law library has been the 
object of our greatest and most constant solicitude . . . . We have also 
constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the proper workshop of 
professors and students alike; that it is to us all what the laboratories of the 
university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history 
to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists. 
C. C. Langdell, Teaching Law As a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123, 124 (1887). 
 15. Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 
837, 838 n.3 (1990).   
 16. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314; STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52.   
 17. Mathias Reimann, A Career in Itself: The German Professiorate As a Model for 
American Legal Academica, in THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE 
COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-1920 165, 178-79 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).   
 18. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 53. Langdell may have adopted this law-as-science 
perspective to please Eliot, who had a science background and had taught chemistry at 
Harvard. BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: 
C.C. LANGDELL, 1826-1906 app. 2 at 351 (2009); Chase, supra note 12, at 334. 
 19. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 217 n.9. In the late 1910s, no state required law 
school attendance, but change was on the horizon. Id. at 99. 
 20. Id. at 217 n.9. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at xiii. 
 23. Douglas D. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism 
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he or she is “both the gatekeeper[] and molder[] of the profession.”24 
In 1927, Felix Frankfurter, then a law professor at Harvard 
University and later a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, observed, 
“In the last analysis, the law is what the lawyers are. And the law 
and the lawyers are what the law schools make them.”25 Eventually, 
in 1921, after the Langdellian paradigm had taken hold firmly, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) recognized the law professor’s 
“claim to primacy in teaching” law.26 
The law professor, situated within the university, needed to have 
a role, or persona, suitable for the new university paradigm. The 
career practitioner who had supervised prospective lawyers under 
the apprentice system would not fit. Consequently, lawyers who 
supported a university-based approach to preparing prospective 
lawyers for entry into the field had to devise another persona for the 
law professor, and they did just that, employing discourse to develop 
a scholar persona. When other lawyers disagreed with the concept of 
the scholar persona, particularly regarding what it meant for the 
education of future lawyers, the other lawyers responded with their 
own discourse that supported a practitioner persona for the law 
professor. Through rhetoric, two groups within the legal field focused 
on different “values, needs, and purposes,”27 and the controversy 
became a sign of a field in transition. 
This Article explains how lawyers like Langdell and James Barr 
Ames, a disciple of Langdell, employed rhetoric between 1870, when 
Langdell assumed the deanship at Harvard Law School, and 1920, 
when law had emerged as a credible academic field in the United 
States, to construct a persona, that of a scholar, appropriate for the 
law professor situated within the university. To do so, the Article will 
contextualize the rhetoric with historical background on the law 
professor and legal education, draw upon rhetorical theory to give an 
overview of persona theory and persona analysis as a means of 
conducting the study, and elaborate upon both the new scholar 
persona that lawyers like Langdell and Ames constructed and the 
practitioner persona that other lawyers attempted to promote as the 
standard. For this study, the term lawyers will refer to practicing 
lawyers and judges as well as academic lawyers. Although rhetoric 
cannot resolve all conflicts, the significance of the rhetoric in this 
 
in Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 232 (1985). 
 24. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An 
Empirical Profile of the Nation’s Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 193 
(1991). 
 25. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992). 
 26. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314, 317. 
 27. Paul Stob, Chisholm v. Georgia and the Question of the Judiciary in the Early 
Republic, 42 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 127, 127-28 (2006). 
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case is hard to overstate because the scholar persona constructed 
after the Civil War and before the Jazz Age is the persona that, with 
minor modifications, continues to shape law students, and thus 
future lawyers, in the present day.28 
II.  THE LAW PROFESSOR AND LEGAL EDUCATION FROM CONTINENTAL 
EUROPE TO ENGLAND TO THE UNITED STATES 
The role of the law professor in the United States developed 
alongside the role of the law school. Like many U.S. phenomena, this 
one began in Europe. On the European continent itself before the 
founding of the United States, formal university education was a 
prerequisite for admission to the bar, although practical training was 
another component of admission, too.29 Law teachers in Europe were 
academics who wrote commentaries on the civil law in an effort “to 
organize and systematize the law.”30 To the contrary, in England, 
university education was not a prerequisite for admission to the bar, 
although many lawyers had university educations, but 
apprenticeship was a prerequisite.31 Teachers at the Inns of Court, 
where future lawyers learned to practice law and which date back at 
least as far as the thirteenth century,32 were legal practitioners.33 
Although today in the United Kingdom an academic segment of 
preparation for entry into the legal field generally takes place within 
the parameters of an undergraduate education,34 this was not always 
the case. The bar apparently considered the Inns sufficient. 
In England, civil and canon law had been taught at Oxford and 
Cambridge, but professorships in common law were relatively 
unknown before the time of Sir William Blackstone.35 Beginning in a 
series of lectures at Oxford in 1753, Blackstone sought to move 
English legal education into academia,36 and, although the idea did 
not catch on immediately, Blackstone played an important role in the 
development of a new English, and ultimately U.S., connection 
between legal education and the university.37 In taking a step toward 
 
 28. See Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions 
of the U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701, 702, 725 (2012).  
 29. Currie, supra note 1, at 342.  
 30. Roscoe Pound, The Achievement of the American Law School, 38 DICTA 269, 
269 (1961). 
 31. Currie, supra note 1, at 342. 
 32. Wilfrid Bovey, The Control Exercised by the Inns of Court over Admission to the 
Bar in England, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 334, 334 (1913).  
 33. Pound, supra note 30, at 269.   
 34. Michael I. Swygert, Striving to Make Great Lawyers — Citizenship and Moral 
Responsibility: A Jurisprudence for Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REV. 803, 806 n.9 (1989). 
 35. See Currie, supra note 1, at 346-47. 
 36. Id. at 347. 
 37. Id. at 347, 349. 
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his ideal, Blackstone became, in 1758, “the first professor of English 
law at any English University.”38 Unfortunately for Blackstone, his 
plan for a college of law at Oxford did not materialize, and, in 1766, 
the professor resigned in disappointment.39 Nonetheless, Blackstone 
set a key precedent for the university law professor within the 
English common law system. 
In the United States, Blackstone’s borrowed idea of a nexus 
between legal study and the university slowly began to take hold. 
During the final decades of the eighteenth century, four university 
law professorships developed in the States, and three more such 
professorships were in the planning stages.40 For example, in 1779, 
Thomas Jefferson created at William and Mary College the first 
notable professorship of law in the United States, which George 
Wythe assumed.41 In 1794, Columbia appointed James Kent as a 
professor of law.42 In his inaugural lecture, Kent noted the following: 
A lawyer in a free country, should have all the requisites of 
Quintilian’s orator.  He should be a person of irreproachable virtue 
and goodness. He should be well read in the whole circle of the arts 
and sciences. He should be fit for the administration of public 
affairs, and to govern the commonwealth by his councils, establish 
it by his laws, and correct it by his example.43  
Kent added that the lawyer should be familiar with the Greek and 
Roman classics, know something of civil law, be able to reason well 
after having studied logic and mathematics, possess a good sense of 
moral philosophy, and have mastered public speaking.44 An 
important point from Kent’s lecture is that to be well qualified to 
serve society, lawyers ought to have broad educations, and one source 
of a broad education is the university.45 
Despite the beginnings of the development of the idea of the law 
professor that had come about in the United States by the end of the 
eighteenth century,46 preparation for admission to the bar at that 
time generally took place in the apprenticeship setting,47 but law 
 
 38. James Bradley Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. 
L. REV. 169, 170 (1895). 
 39. Id. at 171. 
 40. Currie, supra note 1, at 350. 
 41. Id. at 350-51. 
 42. Robert S. Pasley, The Position of the Law School in the University, 16 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 34, 37 (1966). 
 43. James Kent, Professor of Law, Columbia Coll., An Introductory Lecture to a 
Course of Law Lectures (Nov. 17, 1794), in 3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 338 (1903).  
 44. Id. at 338-40.   
 45. Pasley, supra note 42, at 37-38. 
 46. See Currie, supra note 1, at 350-51. 
 47. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 278-79 (1973). 
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schools nonetheless began to develop.48 For instance, in 1784, the 
Connecticut-based Litchfield Law School, although not associated 
with a university, opened as an extension of practical training.49 
Judge Tapping Reeve was the founder.50 His school grew in size and 
attracted students from across the country.51 The Litchfield Law 
School operated until 1833, ultimately having suffered from the 
effects of competition.52 In 1817, two years after establishing the 
inaugural Royall Professorship of Law, Harvard opened its own law 
school, but the school did not survive and had to close temporarily.53 
Various factors, including high tuition and expenses, as well as 
competition from both law offices and other law schools, contributed 
to Harvard’s short-lived original operation of its law school.54 Just 
before it closed, the school had four students and then only one.55   
In 1829, Joseph Story, who was sitting on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, assumed a professorship of law at Harvard and revived that 
institution’s law school in part due to his “reputation as a jurist and 
success as a teacher.”56 In his inaugural address, Story, connecting 
law to other fields as Blackstone and Kent had done, noted that “‘law 
searches into and expounds the elements of morals and ethics, and 
the eternal law of nature, illustrated and supported by the eternal 
law of revelation.’”57 However, to gain new students and re-establish 
the law school, Story moved the law school away from the policies of 
other college programs and allowed students without college degrees 
or even college eligibility to enter the law school.58 Apparently, 
pragmatics had to come before ideals because the previous shortage 
of students had brought about the failure of the law school,59 and one 
can assume that Story did not want that failure to recur.  In his 
quest to revitalize Harvard Law School, Story was successful in 
attracting students from all over the country.60 
Despite an early failure, the Harvard Law School became “the 
first university school of law in any common law country” and, as “an 
academic professional school,” stood in contrast to both “the purely 
 
 48. Id. at 279. 
 49. Thayer, supra note 38, at 171.  
 50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 279.   
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Pasley, supra note 42, at 38-39. 
 54. Currie, supra note 1, at 360. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 361, 362.  
 57. Id. at 362 (internal citation omitted). 
 58. Id. at 363. 
 59. See id. at 360. 
 60. Erwin N. Griswold, English and American Legal Education, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
429, 431 (1958). 
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academic law schools of Continental Europe and the purely 
professional legal education prevailing in England.”61 Although its 
program drew upon existing legal education in Europe,62 Harvard 
offered a new type of legal education that previewed the future of 
legal education in the United States.63  
As noted above, by the 1870s, lawyers like Langdell were 
beginning actively to develop U.S. law into an academic field within 
the university.64 During this period, lawyers who supported the law 
school approach to legal education faced the challenge of justifying 
their nontraditional approach.65 These lawyers needed to distinguish 
their product from the more traditional product of law office study.66 
Much as, during critical historical moments, U.S. legal minds had 
drawn upon British common law,67 U.S. lawyers in the late 
nineteenth century could draw upon Blackstone’s borrowed idea of 
the nexus between legal study and the university.68 However, lacking 
contemporary models of academic lawyers in Britain, the U.S. 
lawyers had to look to continental Europe, and particularly to 
Germany, “the citadel of legal learning,” for contemporary models of 
academic lawyers.69 These U.S. lawyers attempted to differentiate 
between academic lawyers and practicing lawyers and chose to 
associate the former, unlike the latter, with the university, “a 
powerful symbol and an increasingly powerful institution” at the end 
of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century.70 
From this perspective, the law school-educated lawyer could claim 
the benefit of having studied law under individuals associated with 
the university.71   
Langdell’s approach to developing academic law and its role 
within the university was controversial but, in terms of influence and 
longevity, ultimately successful. During his first year of teaching, 
students came to know Langdell “as an ‘old crank,’” and the number 
 
 61. 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 
197 (1965). 
 62. See, e.g., Reimann, supra note 17, at 167. 
 63. CHROUST, supra note 61, at 197; Pasley, supra note 42, at 39. 
 64. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52.  
 65. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 320. 
 66. Id. at 320-21. 
 67. See Bjørn F. Stillion Southard, Prudential Argumentation and John Marshall’s 
Opinion in Marbury v. Madison (1803), 44 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 1, 16 (2007) 
(noting that Marshall’s Marbury decision drew upon elements of British common law). 
 68. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 1, at 348. 
 69. Reimann, supra note 17, at 167. During the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, common law lawyers thought of German legal culture as “the 
leader of the civil law tradition.” Id. at 169.  In the civil law tradition, certain lawyers 
had focused on scholarship and teaching since medieval times. Id. at 191. 
 70. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 320-21. 
 71. See id. 
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of students in his class fell to seven or eight.72 Also, some leading 
lawyers like Oliver Wendell Holmes, who suggested in a book review 
of Langdell’s casebook Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts that 
the casebook editor was mad, disagreed with Langdell’s approach to 
teaching law.73 Nonetheless, Langdell’s disciples like James Barr 
Ames, himself a professor and later dean at Harvard Law School,74 
adopted the Langdellian approach to teaching law and helped to 
spread that approach throughout the world of legal education. 
Despite its many problems, such as virtually ignoring trial court 
records, document-drafting skills, and witness preparation,75 
Langdell’s approach to teaching law seemed like “an intellectual 
Model T, a wholly complete, conceptually unified universe to put in 
the mind of the standard student.”76 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, university law school 
attendance became increasingly more important,77 and the trend 
toward professionalization continued. By the early 1920s, the ABA 
recognized the law professor’s “claim to primacy in teaching law.”78 
The law school was taking over, and the law professor was a key 
actor in the drama. 
Law professors, as members of the university, took to the 
production of knowledge within their newly established academic 
field. Traditionally, a major job of the university has been “to 
advance as well as transmit ordered knowledge. This is the work for 
which its society lets it live and gives it means.”79 Accordingly, while 
the law schools had the duty of training students for practice at the 
bar, the law schools also had to contribute to the larger university 
setting. One lasting outlet for legal research was the Harvard Law 
Review, established in 1887.80 Other successful scholarly legal 
journals, including the Yale Law Journal in 1891 and the Columbia 
Law Review in 1901, followed.81 In 1896, the law school at the 
University of Pennsylvania acquired the already-existing American 
 
 72. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 66 n.15. 
 73. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 322 (citing Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233 (1880)). 
 74. Borthwick & Schau, supra note 24, at 191; KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 339. 
Ames had not practiced law, which caused controversy among Harvard Law School 
faculty members when he was hired. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 171-72. 
 75. Pasley, supra note 42, at 43. 
 76. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 323. 
 77. SANDRA P. EPSTEIN, LAW AT BERKELEY: THE HISTORY OF BOALT HALL 27 
(1997). 
 78. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 317. 
 79. James Willard Hurst, Research Responsibilities of University Law Schools, 10 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 147 (1957). 
 80. Currie, supra note 1, at 331. 
 81. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 128 n.34. 
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Law Register as that school’s law review.82 By 1927, forty-two law 
journals were or had been in existence.83 
In associating legal education with the university, lawyers who 
supported the academic study of law attempted to raise standards for 
law school admission and legal study.84 The raised standards 
included the requirements of some college education prior to law 
school and more time spent in the study of law.85 For example, at 
Harvard Law School, students without college degrees had to pass 
entrance examinations that would consist of subjects such as 
Blackstone’s Commentaries and Latin or French.86 Also, the faculty 
at Harvard increased the program of study from under two years to 
two full years in 1871 and from two years to three years in 1876, 
although then the third year did not have to be in residence.87  By 
1899, Harvard required all three years of study to be in residence.88 
In contrast to offering the law office experience, university law 
schools were issuing degrees. For a long time, law schools issued the 
bachelor of laws degree (LL.B.), which became the traditional 
standard.89 The elevated standards for university law schools 
precluded many immigrants and children of immigrants from 
attending law school at universities, which may have pleased the 
lawyers at the law schools that sought more “respectability.”90  
The university law school was rapidly gaining a major portion of 
control of access to the legal field. In 1895, James Bradley Thayer 
observed that, in developing Blackstone’s borrowed notion of 
university legal education, complete with law professors, the United 
States “transplanted an English root, and nurtured and developed it, 
while at home [in England] it was suffered to languish and die 
down.”91 Thayer pointed out that “the great experiment in the 
University teaching of our law at Oxford” had “furnished the 
stimulus and the exemplar for our own early attempts at systematic 
legal education.”92 In short, lawyers in the United States had taken 
Blackstone’s borrowed idea of the university law school, which had 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Mark Bartholomew, Legal Separation: The Relationship Between the Law 
School and the Central University in the Late Nineteenth Century, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
368, 388 (2003) (discussing how various elite law schools followed Harvard’s lead in 
adopting higher standards for admission). 
 85. See id. 
 86. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 530-31. 
 87. Id. at 531. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Jay W. Stein, The Juris Doctor, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 315 (1963). 
 90. Bartholomew, supra note 84, at 388. 
 91. Thayer, supra note 38, at 170. 
 92. Id. 
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come from the European continent, and run with it. After the 
establishment of law professorships and law schools in the States, 
lawyers developed law as an academic field, more rigorous standards 
for admission to law school, and an increasingly more demanding 
degree that graduates would earn. The trade was evolving into a 
profession that stemmed from the university, and the law professor 
had a crucial role to play in the preparation of future lawyers. With 
such a connection between law and the university, lawyers needed a 
persona for the law professor that was appropriate for law as an 
academic field, not for law as a trade. 
III.  PERSONA THEORY AND PERSONA ANALYSIS93 
This section of the Article addresses the theory and methodology 
for the present study. More particularly, the section looks to 
rhetorical theory for a discussion of persona theory and persona 
analysis. 
A.  Persona Theory 
Persona theory helps to inform the discussion of a law professor 
persona suitable for law as an academic field. This theory addresses 
the roles, or personae, that communicators create in discourse.94 At 
least four types of personae can be present in discourse, including the 
first, second, third, and fourth personae.95 However, given the focus 
of this Article on the first persona of the law professor, this 
subsection will concentrate on the first persona. The second, third, 
and fourth personae, which deal with audiences, will not receive 
attention here. 
The first persona is “the constructed speaker/writer or ‘I’ of 
discourse.”96 Such a persona is “‘the created personality put forth in 
the act of communicating’”97 and allows the communicator to identify 
with the audience.98 In literature, the first persona is the speaker or 
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character a writer creates in the course of crafting writing like poetry 
or fiction.99 In a way, a first persona is a mask that the 
communicator chooses to wear as he or she performs rhetorically, 
and because the persona at issue is a mask, the persona is not 
necessarily the communicator himself or herself.100 
Critics have observed that communicators have adopted various 
first personae. For instance, in 1916, Marcus Garvey, the then-
unknown leader of the new Universal Negro Improvement 
Association, faced the problem of leading members of an outsider 
racial group against social injustice.101 In part, Garvey met the 
challenge by assuming a Black Moses persona.102 Specifically, in his 
rhetoric, Garvey relied upon subjects like election, captivity, and 
liberation, calling to mind Moses and the Jewish experiences from 
the Old Testament.103 While Garvey was not actually Moses, he did 
assume the Moses persona. A more recent communicator who 
adopted the Moses persona, among other personae, was Louis 
Farrakhan. In his Million Man March speech, which he delivered on 
October 16, 1995, in Washington, D.C., Farrakhan attempted to 
enhance his credibility, or ethos, which had suffered due to 
Farrakhan’s prior inflammatory racial discourse, by assuming a 
prophetic persona, specifically that of Moses.104 In a related example, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., assumed in his discourse against civil rights 
violations the general persona of a prophet, although despite his 
skillful performance King was not necessarily an actual prophet.105 
Communicators sometimes perform multidimensional first 
personae. In the Gospel of St. Matthew, Christ performed a persona 
that included several roles: human being, teacher, and ruler.106 
Reconciliation of these competing roles within this persona came 
with Christ’s resurrection near the end of St. Matthew’s account.107 
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In his famous pamphlet Common Sense, Thomas Paine constructed a 
persona complete with an inherent tension between a self-revealing 
individual and an impersonal individual.108 Paine’s persona provided 
much intimate detail about a private life but revealed little 
information about a public life.109 This approach allowed Paine to 
assume a common individual persona, complete with the capacity to 
reason but devoid of “birth, station, and office,” and to develop a 
special type of charisma.110 Much more recently, in the years after 
her role in the Clinton Administration’s quest for national health 
care but before she announced that she would run for one of New 
York’s seats in the U.S. Senate, Hillary Rodham Clinton performed a 
persona that was traditionally “feminine” and family-oriented as well 
as policy-oriented.111 This multidimensional persona helped to make 
Rodham Clinton a more appealing, and thus viable, candidate for the 
Senate seat that she ultimately won.112 
The existing corpus of research on first personae has focused 
predominantly on the performance of personae communicators 
select.113 Although some communicators might create their own first 
personae,114 many communicators employ first personae already in 
existence, such as Marcus Garvey and Martin Luther King, Jr., did. 
In the cases of Garvey and King, respectively, the chosen personae 
were Moses specifically and a prophet more generally.115 Because the 
scholarly interest has tended to be what communicators do with the 
assumed personae, scholars often have ignored much or all of the 
process of the creation of rhetorical personae.  
Along this line, scholars who have focused on performance of 
first personae have not explored in depth situations in which 
communicators create in their discourse first personae for future use. 
While in certain cases the two concepts of construction and 
performance of first personae can function together, distinguishing 
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between two major types of first personae is necessary. On one hand, 
a communicator can select and assume a persona in his or her 
communication. This process is one of performance, so this type of 
persona is a first persona performed (FPP). On the other hand, a 
communicator might create a persona, which the communicator 
himself or herself or a different communicator might employ in 
subsequent discourse. This process is one of construction of a 
discursive tool for later implementation, so this type of first persona 
is a first persona constructed (FPC).   
B.  Persona Analysis 
Some scholars have labeled the methodology for doing a persona 
theory study persona analysis.116 At least two types of persona 
analysis are possible. One type of analysis is first persona performed 
(FPP), which considers roles that communicators perform in 
discourse, while the other type of analysis is first persona constructed 
(FPC), which considers the rhetorical construction of roles that 
communicators can perform in the future. Although FPP has been 
the traditional approach taken in rhetorical studies, FPC, which this 
Article seeks to develop, is more appropriate for this study because 
the present study focuses on creation, not performance, of roles.   
The present FPC study involves identification of the various 
traits of the law professor for which, between 1870 and 1920, lawyers 
argued in their writings and organization of such traits into 
categories of personae. For instance, such traits include participating 
in full-time teaching and research, as well as having extensive 
practical experience in lawyering. These traits may be more scholarly 
or more pragmatic in nature. When considered together, the 
particular characteristics within artifacts offer an outline of the law 
professor persona that communicators have put forth. Unlike an FPP 
analysis, an FPC analysis may not give the critic the opportunity to 
rely upon various precedents for the study of the persona because the 
persona is often new.   
Research for this Article did not locate any examples of FPC 
studies. As noted above, critics have focused their energies on 
studying the FPP. Nonetheless, rhetorical personae have to come 
from somewhere, so at some point in time their construction must 
have taken place.  Accordingly, FPC studies are appropriate, and this 
Article offers such a study. 
The texts for this current research come from a search of 
HeinOnline. This electronic database contains law review articles 
that date back to the nineteenth century. For example, the database 
contains the first issue of the American Law Register, which debuted 
in 1852 and later became the University of Pennsylvania Law 
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Review.117 Although HeinOnline does not necessarily contain all law 
reviews, the database does contain hundreds of law reviews, 
including law reviews at some of the most influential law schools. A 
critical advantage of the database is that, unlike databases such as 
Westlaw and LexisNexis, HeinOnline contains numerous articles 
from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, which 
is essential for a study focused on the era from 1870 to 1920. Hence, 
because it dates back so far, HeinOnline proved to be an appropriate 
database for this particular study. 
The search in HeinOnline identified any law review article that 
contained the terms law and professor in the title. Many such 
articles, although not all, would be likely to address the subject of 
this current study, but these articles would not necessarily provide a 
comprehensive listing of relevant articles since the discourse may 
have appeared in articles that did not focus exclusively on the law 
professor. To increase the number of appropriate articles identified, 
the search included locating relevant articles cited in the footnotes of 
the articles that resulted from the HeinOnline search. Accordingly, 
while the texts located for this study are by no means all of those 
relevant to the topic, they are both broad in their historical origins 
and not necessarily limited to articles that focused exclusively on the 
law professor. 
IV.  THE LAW PROFESSOR PERSONA—SCHOLAR V. PRACTITIONER  
Applying persona theory to the texts identified for the study, this 
section of the Article examines the two main personae that lawyers 
put forth in their rhetoric between 1870 and 1920. The discussion 
focuses on the persona of the law professor as scholar and the 
persona of the law professor as practitioner.118 
A.  The Law Professor As Scholar 
As noted above, by the end of the nineteenth century, the 
university law school was rapidly gaining control of a major portion 
of access to the legal field. Beginning in the 1870s, various key 
players at Harvard Law School and other elite law schools 
energetically began to promote a new persona for the law professor. 
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James Barr Ames of Harvard maintained in 1900 that the law 
professorship would be “a new career in the legal profession.”119 
William R. Vance, professor at Yale Law School, referred to this 
persona as that which “the new class of lawyers just emerging into 
group consciousness” would adopt.120 As is possible with personae,121 
this law professor persona involved multiple dimensions, including 
(1) an almost exclusive professional commitment, (2) teaching duties, 
(3) the production of research, and (4) a public function. The ensuing 
discussion examines the arguments that fleshed out this persona. 
First, pro-scholar advocates argued that the law professor should 
devote almost all professional time to the university.122 Ames 
commented that “[t]he work of a law professor is strenuous enough to 
tax the energies of the most vigorous and demands an undivided 
allegiance.”123 To support his vision for this dimension of the law 
professor persona, Ames observed that at various law schools like 
those of Harvard, Columbia, Virginia, Washington and Lee, Cornell, 
and Stanford, a professional devotion had become the norm for law 
professors.124 Vance agreed with Ames.125 Noting that law belonged 
in the university setting and adding that a “studious faculty” should 
guide the study of law, James Bradley Thayer offered essentially the 
same position on this point that the law professor should devote a 
career to the university.126 Professors should “give, substantially, 
their whole time and strength to the work,” Thayer urged.127 
In advancing this argument and also in part refuting the claim 
that opponents of the scholar model made regarding the need for 
practical experience, another Thayer, Ezra Ripley Thayer of 
Harvard, explained what might happen if a law professor had 
substantial duties outside of the university.128 If a law professor had 
to practice law, the uncertainties of legal practice, especially the 
timing of trials, could conflict with the law professor’s teaching.129 
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Indeed, “the impossibility of combining a trial practice with proper 
teaching” was a problem.130 Ezra Ripley Thayer suggested that if the 
number of treatises law professors had produced had declined by the 
early 1910s, the decline was due to the lack of time for production of 
such research.131 In short, law professors were not to spend much 
time, if any, in the practice of law; rather, the university deserved 
their almost undivided attention. 
Second, advocates of the scholar persona argued that the law 
professor persona should include a teaching dimension.132 The law 
professor who had mastered an area of the law had to find ways to 
teach that area of law to law students.133 Ames endorsed the 
Langdellian inductive method of legal studies, by which students 
would ascertain legal principles from cases and discern where the 
law on a given matter stood.134 The professor would lead classroom 
discussion on a subject, and ideally the discussion would continue 
outside of the classroom so that the students would have vigorously 
engaged the course materials.135 H. B. Hutchins of the University of 
Michigan also noted the importance of teaching as one dimension in 
the law professor persona,136 as did Felix Frankfurter of Harvard.137 
Suggesting that the law professor had to place “before his students 
and make[ ] beautiful to their eyes those great principles of right and 
justice that either do underlie, or should underlie, all of our rules of 
law,” Vance went so far as to compare a law professor’s teaching in 
the classroom to the teaching of Christ in the New Testament.138 
On this note, professors had to devote a substantial amount of 
time to teaching.139 James Bradley Thayer observed, “[W]hen the 
work is fitly performed, [it] calls for an amount of time, thought and 
attention bestowed on the personal side of a man’s relation to his 
students which instructors now can seldom give.”140 Ezra Ripley 
Thayer added, “The mere preparation for [the law professor’s] class-
room work will itself be a large matter.”141 From this perspective, the 
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law professor would need to spend time considering how to make 
sense out of what the professor’s own law professors had taught the 
professor.142 Once the law professor had formulated a personal 
understanding of the law, the professor would discuss that 
understanding with students not only in class but also outside of 
class.143 
While some experience with legal practice might be helpful, such 
experience was not the main, or even a key, feature behind the 
teaching dimension of the law professor persona.144 Indeed, the 
practitioner was the law professor of the past. Under the old regime, 
the law professor might have been someone who was “a lawyer in full 
practice and a teacher only as his professional engagements [would] 
permit” or perhaps “a judge upon the bench and a teacher 
incidentally.”145 However, the law professor of the present was “a 
lawyer withdrawn from practice and its emoluments”146 who had 
learned law “by scholarly research.”147 Langdell argued the following 
about the new law professor, in part refuting the claim that 
opponents of the scholar persona made about the need for practical 
experience: 
What qualifies a person . . . to teach law, is not experience in the 
work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in dealing with men, not 
experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in 
short, in using law, but experience in learning law, not the 
experience of the Roman advocate, or of the Roman praetor, still 
less of the Roman procurator, but the experience of the Roman 
jurisconsult.148 
Indeed, for Langdell and the lawyers who supported his position, a 
law professor was one who was more familiar with the path of 
studying law than the path of practicing law. As unorthodox as this 
view was in the United States at the time, the new law professor 
persona was not oriented toward having a dimension of legal 
practice.149 
Third, advocates of the scholar persona argued that the law 
professor persona also should have a research dimension.150 Calling 
upon the European tradition of legal education, Ames asserted that 
in Germany “we find a large body of legal literature, of a high 
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quality, the best and the greater part of which is the work of 
professors.”151 Identifying several law professors as “the lights of the 
legal profession in Germany,” Ames noted, “The influence of their 
opinions in the courts is as great or even greater than that of judicial 
precedents.”152 Ames lamented his perception that the legal 
literature of the United States lagged behind that of Europe, and he 
desired that law professors in the United States begin to develop 
“treatises on all the important branches of the law, exhibiting the 
historical development of the subject and containing sound 
conclusions based upon scientific analysis.”153 The advantage of the 
treatises was that the judge, who was not an expert in all areas of 
the law, would “have the benefit of the conclusions of specialists or 
professors.”154   
Other lawyers besides Ames argued for the importance of the 
production of research as a dimension of the law professor persona. 
For instance, James Bradley Thayer justified the research dimension 
of the law professor persona by claiming that law professors had 
“much formidable labor [to do] in exploring the history and 
chronological development of our law in all its parts.”155 Also, 
Hutchins viewed scholarship as “[a] first requisite of effective law 
teaching,”156 a requisite that would inform one’s teaching. By the 
term scholarship, Hutchins did not mean “the scholarship of the 
practitioner who investigates from time to time parts of subjects to 
meet immediate professional demands”; instead, Hutchins referred to 
“the scholarship that comes from scientific and systematic study in a 
rather limited field of our jurisprudence.”157 An important point here 
was that the law professor’s research would point out “not only what 
the law within a given field has been and is, but also what it should 
be.”158 Vance cited examples of research on the law such as John 
Henry Wigmore’s work in the area of evidence and John Chipman 
Gray’s work on the rule against perpetuities.159 Hutchins maintained 
that the ideal law professor persona of the future would be a persona 
free from distractions from “the field of research and legal 
authorship.”160 
Such research that was an important part of the new law 
professor persona would be specialized in nature. The law professor, 
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Hutchins argued, should not have “to become a master of half a 
dozen disconnected subjects in the law and to speak and write in 
regard to them with authority.”161 Rather, the law professor was to 
become an expert in one, two, or perhaps three areas of the law and 
to publish in these areas.162 Accordingly, the law professor with one 
or more specialties might produce “treatises of the highest class.”163 
Fourth, and on a note related to research, pro-scholar lawyers 
argued that the law professor persona should include a public 
function dimension.164 This public function could play out in several 
ways.  For instance, as suggested above, the law professor could 
conduct research that would benefit the judiciary.165 Also, the law 
professor’s research could provide criticism of new legislation.166 
Further, the law professor might participate in the drafting of new 
legislation, perhaps joining judges and practicing lawyers in the 
preparation of such legislation.167 One example of this might be the 
re-drafting of criminal statutes.168 
Beyond these tasks, such a public function included advancing 
the standards for admission to study law.169 These standards might 
include an increased number of years of preparation for the study of 
law. Noting, in 1908, that four years of high school were the general 
requirement for law school admission, Hutchins predicted that more 
schools would adopt the requirement of a year of college work, which 
some law schools already required, and that, in the future, multiple 
years of college work could become the prerequisite for law school 
admission.170 Regardless of the particulars, the law professor would 
be the one to work on standards, especially because the law professor 
was aware of the needs of the students who were already studying 
law.171 
From a pragmatic perspective, Frankfurter explained why the 
law professor persona should include a public function dimension. 
Frankfurter noted that unlike the members of the judiciary and the 
practicing bar, who were “overworked,” law professors, who were 
“free . . . from the absorption of practice,” could turn their time to 
developing the law.172 Operating under the law-as-science paradigm, 
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Frankfurter suggested that law professors might develop legal 
hypotheses that practicing lawyers and judges would test.173 
Frankfurter used Joseph Story’s work on developing a restatement of 
the English common law as an example to further this particular 
point.174 In this manner, Frankfurter refuted the pro-practitioners’ 
call for the law professor to practice and teach simultaneously.  
As just laid out, the scholar version of the law professor persona 
included four major dimensions for which lawyers offered support: an 
almost exclusive professional commitment, teaching duties, the 
production of research, and a public function. Although this persona 
consisted of several dimensions, these dimensions came together to 
form one unified scholar persona. In the United States, then, this 
was the new professor-as-scholar persona that lawyers at Harvard 
and various other elite law schools constructed and disseminated 
through their rhetoric. 
B.  The Law Professor As Practitioner 
Commentary has observed that “law is a dualistic, adversarial 
system.”175 While lawyers like Langdell and Ames were attempting to 
construct the law professor persona as scholarly in nature, other 
lawyers were trying to resist such rhetoric by presenting the law 
professor persona as more practical in nature. This latter 
understanding of the law professor was more traditional in the 
United States than the understanding of lawyers like Langdell and 
Ames, but, in light of the pro-scholars’ spirited advocacy, the latter 
position required vigorous advancement. In presenting their ideal 
persona, pro-practitioner lawyers argued (1) that law was a practical 
subject that called for practical training and (2) that only an 
individual with practical background was well-suited for assuming 
the law professor persona. The ensuing discussion examines the 
arguments that fleshed out this persona. 
First, as noted, lawyers who supported the practitioner persona 
for the law professor argued that law was a practical subject that 
called for practical training. For example, Paul L. Martin, dean of the 
Creighton University Law School, argued that a lawyer’s academic 
training alone was insufficient because it would “fail to fit the law 
graduate for that immediate service which he aspires to render.”176 
Instead, “a sufficient training in practice” was vital.177 Relying upon 
an analogy with medical education, Martin pointed out that medical 
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students would spend the majority of their last two years of medical 
school in hospitals and clinics in which the students would “learn to 
apply practically what they ha[d] gleaned from the books.”178 Martin 
extended the significance of this analogy by noting that dental, 
pharmacy, and engineering students also had practical components 
to their respective educations.179  Claiming that law schools could 
give law students “more than mere theory,” Philip T. Van Zile, dean 
of the Detroit College of Law, agreed that law students should gain 
substantial practical experience.180 Van Zile maintained that law 
schools could not pay too much attention to the teaching of legal 
practice because the idea was to give law students as much 
experience as possible, not only in the realm of litigation, but also in 
other branches of practice.181 
David Werner Amram of the University of Pennsylvania, who 
concurred with the positions of lawyers like Martin and Van Zile, 
further argued for the importance of practical subjects.182 To help 
justify more practical work in U.S. law schools, Amram cited the 
experiences of the legal fields in other countries.183 For instance, law 
graduates in Germany had three years of apprenticeship before 
practicing law, including one year in public administration, one and 
one-half years in lower court practice, and one-half year in higher 
court practice.184 Law graduates in Canada had to spend several 
years as clerks in solicitors’ offices.185 While the German and 
Canadian systems were not perfect, the U.S. system comparatively 
lagged behind in preparing lawyers to practice.186 Amram proposed 
that the following practical subjects appear in the curricula at U.S. 
law schools: practice and procedure, preparation of litigation papers, 
inspection of courts, preparation of non-contentious papers, law office 
management, use of the law library, and brief preparation.187 
Thinking that students would learn trial practice more effectively in 
actual courts, Amram left that area off his list of recommended 
practical subjects.188 
While lawyers were the principal participants in this conflict, 
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they were not the only participants. For example, Walter K. Towers, 
a law student at the University of Michigan, joined the cause for the 
practitioner model.189 Towers conveyed the story of a colleague “who 
finished a year’s study of the law with excellent marks, yet did not 
know what ‘34 Michigan, 254,’ meant.”190 Towers pointed out that 
because law students often entered a new and unfamiliar world when 
they commenced studying law, one should refrain from assuming 
“that the ordinary law student has, or can secure for himself, any 
practical details that are not taught as part of or involved in the 
regular school work.”191 
Second, as the above rhetoric would suggest, individuals who 
adopted this practice-oriented position argued that only an individual 
with practical background was well-suited for assuming the law 
professor persona. J. Newton Fiero, dean of the Albany Law School, 
argued that only the practitioner had “a true perspective” on the 
various topics at law school and that the practitioner’s illustrations 
from actual practice would impress the student.192 As Van Zile noted, 
law professors “should be something more than school teachers.”193 
Instead, law professors ought to be the following: 
[M]en who have had practice in the profession, in the law office, 
and in the courts; men of experience in all the work of the 
profession, as well as men of learning, who are able to teach the 
law and apply it, who are not confined to books alone, but who can 
draw from the wellsprings of legal lore gathered from an actual and 
successful practice.194 
The law professor, then, was a legal practitioner. 
Pro-practitioner lawyers argued that a law professor who 
assumed a scholar persona was not well equipped for the job. 
Refuting the rhetoric of the advocates of the scholar model, Fiero 
argued that a law professor who took up the persona of a scholar 
without practical experience was very much like an individual who 
took up the persona of an engineer and then attempted to offer an 
explanation “of the functions and possibilities of a steam engine, 
without instruction as to the method of its operation.”195 Fiero 
extended the analogy in this way:  
It would scarcely be deemed wise to place in charge of a passenger 
train a locomotive engineer whose knowledge of his engine was 
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derived solely from books explaining its construction, and who had 
no instruction as to which lever should be used in going ahead, and 
which one for stopping or backing his train.196  
In short, lack of practical experience at the bar was a serious 
handicap for law professors.197 
In advancing his position, Fiero responded to the pro-scholar 
position of Langdell, Ames, and others. Fiero maintained that his 
rhetorical opponents had “overlooked the fact that there were able 
lawyers in the days before law schools, when the only place for study 
was in the office of the practicing lawyer.”198 By calling on a more 
traditional approach to learning law, Fiero attempted to deny the 
need for the new Harvard approach. 
Thus, despite the rhetoric designed to construct the law 
professor persona as one of a scholar, vigorous opposing rhetoric 
appeared in an effort to present the law professor persona differently. 
Some lawyers simply did not accept the scholar persona and made 
their case for the practitioner persona, arguing that law was a 
practical subject that called for practical training and that only an 
individual with practical background was well-suited for assuming 
the law professor persona.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
In 1921, the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to 
the Bar recommended, and the ABA then accepted, that every 
candidate for bar admission should have graduated from a law school 
that had the following standards: two years of college as a 
prerequisite, three years for full-time law study or longer for part-
time law study, an adequate library available for law students, and a 
large enough number of faculty members who would devote their full 
attention to the law school.199 The ABA’s focus on academic 
standards made it clear that the scholar model of the law professor 
had prevailed.200 Indeed, for at least the previous two decades, the 
scholar model of the law professor had been spreading from Harvard 
to other major universities.201   
The rhetoric regarding the law professor persona was one aspect 
of the larger conflict between 1870 and 1920 over whether law was a 
profession, frequently described at the time as a type of science,202 or 
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a trade. In a report for 1913, the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching noted that the issue of whether law was 
then a profession or a trade was very much alive.203 While engaged in 
this conflict, the legal field lagged behind other fields in 
professionalizing. For example, in medicine at that time, a physician 
would earn a doctor of medicine degree (M.D.), which would provide 
evidence of medical training.204 In law, however, an attorney would 
not necessarily even earn a bachelor of laws degree (LL.B.), the 
degree of the day; often passing a bar examination was the only 
requirement.205 The credentials were not the same.   
Rhetoric provided one way to improve the status of the legal 
field, and so Langdell, Ames, and their allies argued for a professor-
as-scholar model that met the standards of university membership. 
In addition to the dimension of full-time devotion to the job, such a 
persona included teaching, research, and service dimensions.206 At 
that time in the United States, higher education, in drawing 
inspiration from contemporary European universities, was moving 
away from the idea of the liberal arts college and toward the idea of 
the university.207 Consequently, the pro-scholar lawyers developed a 
persona suitable for the university, which was the gateway to 
professional status for the legal field. Indeed, Langdell, Ames, and 
their allies even successfully predicted the future because the scholar 
model of the law professor continues to prosper in the U.S. university 
of the present day.208 As in fields throughout the university, the 
current full-time model in law includes “teaching, writing, and 
service.”209 
At a theoretical level, this discussion of how lawyers like 
Langdell and Ames employed rhetoric between 1870 and 1920 to 
construct a persona appropriate for the law professor situated within 
the university has illustrated the benefits of addressing the first 
persona from a slightly different angle. While prior communication 
research had focused on the performance of a pre-existing first 
persona like that of a prophet, the current study has illustrated in 
detail how communicators can fill volumes in the act of rhetorically 
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constructing a new persona. This distinction is one between the first 
persona performed (FPP) and the first persona constructed (FPC). 
The theoretical distinction allows critics to focus more on either the 
performance or the construction of first personae, although 
performance and construction are not mutually exclusive. For 
instance, once lawyers have constructed a law professor persona, 
conforming law faculty members would perform some version of that 
persona. A focus on the FPC would be useful in studying rhetoric in 
areas outside of legal education, including legal practice and politics. 
In 1900, Ames declared, “I have the faith to believe that at no 
distant day there will be at each of the leading university law 
schools, a body of law professors of distinguished ability, of national 
and international influence.”210 The professors would be “men 
teaching in the grand manner, and adding lustre by their writings to 
the University and to the legal profession.”211 Eventually, Ames 
would get his way. As the university law school began to gain control 
of a major portion of access to the legal field, the law professor would 
assume the persona of a scholar and ultimately become the 
gatekeeper to the profession.212 No longer would the law professor be 
someone with a trade. 
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